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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY SHELMIDINE, et. al., 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
CHARLENE POLLY COOK, 
Intervener, 
-vs-
CHARLES A. JONES, et. al., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 14152 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
THE INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 
The Utah Civil Liberties Union is a branch of the 
American Civil Liberties Union, an organization dedicated 
to the preservation of individual liberty under law. 
Your amicus has entered this case in order to urge to the 
Court its view on the important constitutional issues 
raised by this case. 
STATEMENT 
The amicus accepts the Statement of the Nature of the 
Case, Disposition in the Lower Court, Relief Sought on 
Appeal and Cross Appeal, and Statement of Facts contained 
in the other briefs in this case. In the interest of 
brevity, those statements will not be restated here. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-la-
Ami cus curiae urges that the Court affirm the decision 
below. "That the practise . . . which allows nonlawyer or 
lay justices of the peace to impose a jail sentence or imprison-
ment constitutes a denial of a criminal defendant's right to a 
fair trial. . ." Affirmance of that ruling would leave open 
the issue of the constitutionality of trial before lay justices 
of the peace in cases involving only fines of less than three 
hundred dollars. Affirmance of the decision below would thus 
have minimal impact on the Utah judicial system and leave 
to future decision any questions about the constitutionality 
of trial before a justice of the peace in matters involving 
fines alone. Such a distinction is supportible in principle 
given the significance to anyone of even a short deprivation 
of liberty and the priority of liberty as a value to be 
protected under our system of justice. 
Our contention in this case is founded on guarantees of 
due process contained in both the State and Federal Constitutions; 
Utah Constitution, Article I Section 7, United States Constitution, 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW REQUIRES THAT A JUDGE IN A 
CRIMINAL CASE IN WHICH A JAIL SENTENCE MAY BE 
IMPOSED BE TRAINED IN THE LAW, 
When in 1215 at Runymede, King_ John was forced by his 
barons to sign the Magna Carta, he swore to two propositions 
relevant to this case: 
No free man shall be taken, imprisoned, 
disseased . . . or in any way destroyed, 
nor will we proceed against or prosecute 
him, except by the lawful judgment of his 
peers and by the law of the land. Chapter 
39. 
We will appoint as justiciaries, constables, 
sheriffs- or bailiffs only such men as knox^  
the law of the land and will keep it well. 
Chapter 45. 1 
Magna Carta has often been called the foundation of our 
liberty and the cornerstone of our law. These characteriza-
tions are true, not because the specific rules and standards 
apply to modern time -- though some like those above still 
do --" but because Magna Carta represents a principle, that 
the sovereign is itself subject to law, that citizens have 
rights which government must recognize though on occasion 
it be inconvenient to do so. When King John promised his 
subjects due process of law and the appointment of judges 
who knew the law, he was promising that as sovereign he 
would follow procedures which were just and lawful in 
applying the law of the land. Today, the rights of citizens 
to justice pursuant to law, transcend convenience, transcend 
even the comfort and inertia of established practice when 
A. E. Dick Howard, Magna Carta. Text and Commentary 43, 
45 (1964). Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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it can be shown that established practice has, by reason of 
changing times and changing •ircumstances become inconsistent 
with the due process of law. Your amicus submits this brief to . 
urge that, in 1975 constitutional guarantees of due process 
derived in part from the Magna Carta include the right to be 
tried by a judge trained in the law, and capable, as today only 
a law trained person can be, of knowing the law and applying 
it competently. 
The concept of due process is not a static and fixed con-
cept. If Magna Carta remained but a feudal compact, it would 
be meaningless today. Due process has grown and changed with 
the time truly reflecting in the words of Justice Powell in 
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 467, (1972) that : 
Due process, as consistently interpreted . . . 
commands that citizens subjected to criminal 
process in state courts be accorded those 
rights that are fundamental to a fair trial in 
the context of our American scheme of justice. 
In State v. Phillips, No. 13816,Sept.15, 1975, Justice Ellett 
concurring, quotes Daniel Webster's classic explanation of 
due process, nlaw of the land", in the Dartmouth College 
case, 4 Wheat. 518, 581, as follows: 
[A] law, which hears before it condemns; 
which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders 
judgment only after trial. 
This Court recognized over 80 years ago that constitu-
tional standards derived from the common law changed and 
developed with the development of our society. In Hess v. 
White, 9 Utah 61 (1893) this Court interpreting the right 
to jury trial held unanimous verdict was not required in 
civil cases. The Court said, per curiam,
 at page 68, quoting from 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516: 
The Constitution of the United States 
was ordained, it is true by descendants 
of Englishmen who inherited the tradi-
tions of English law and history; but it 
was made for an undefined and expanding 
future and for a people gathered and to 
be gathered from many nations and of many 
tongues . . . There is nothing in Magna 
Carta, rightly construed as a broad 
charter of public right and law, which 
ought to exclude the best ideas of all 
systems and of every age; and as it was 
the characteristic principle of the common 
law to draw its inspiration from every 
fountain of justice, we are not to assume 
that the sources of its supply have been 
exhausted. On the contrary, we should 
expect that the new and varied experiences 
of our own situation and system will mold 
and shape it into new and not less useful 
forms. 
While the Court in Hess v. White was speaking to the claim 
that the Constitution barred a modern change not known at 
common law, less than unanimous verdicts in civil cases, 
what it said applies equally to a practice known at common 
law no longer consistent in modern society with basic 
standards of right and justice. 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,(1932),Justice Sutherland 
for a unanimous court recognized that a right to counsel in 
a capital case was part of due process of law guaranteed to 
state citizens by the federal Constitution. Justice 
Sutherland so ruled though, as he recognized, the right to 
counsel in felony cases was not recognized by the common 
law of England and seems not to have been unanimously 
recognized by the thirteen colonies before the Declaration 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of Independence.But said Justice Sutherland at page 67: 
The fact that the right involved is 
of such a character that it cannot be 
denied without violating those 'funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil 
and political institutions f.
 # . is obviously 
one of those compelling considerations 
which must prevail in determining 
whether it is embraced within the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 
Justice Sutherland goes on to state the requisites of due 
process at page 68: 
It never has been doubted by this Court 
or any other so far as we know, that 
notice and hearing are preliminary steps 
essential to the passing of an enforceable 
judgment, and that they, together with a 
legally competent tribunal having juris-
diction of the case, constitute basic 
elements of the constitutional requirement 
of due process of law. 
In 1835 Justice Story of the United States Supreme Court 
sitting as Circuit Justice in the case of United States 
v. Battiste, 24 Fed.Cas. 1042 (No. 14,545) rejected the 
rule that jurors were free to disregard rulings and 
instructions of the judge in reaching a verdict on the facts. 
Justice Story said at page 1043: 
I hold it the most sacred constitutional 
right of every party accused of crime, that 
the jury should respond as to the facts and 
the court as to the law . . . Every person 
accused as a criminal has a right to be tried 
according to the law of the land, the fixed 
law of the land; and not by the law as a jury 
may understand it, or choose, from wantonness, 
or ignorance, or accidental mistake, to 
interpret it. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Are counsel for appellants prepared to assert that the lay 
justices of this state, without essential legal training, 
without access to the law books and materials available to 
city court judges and district judges can provide a defendant 
raising legal defenses an adequate and effective resolution 
of his legal claims according to the fixed law of the land 
and not the law as the justice of the peace nmay understand 
it or choose from ignorance or accidental mistake to inter-
pret it." 
Of course the due process clause does not guarantee 
against all possibility of error and even l^ w trained judges, 
like law trained lawyers are not beyond possibility of error. 
But the constitutional guarantees of due process like the 
procedures of law generally are designed to at least minimize 
the likelihood of error. 
The contention of your amicus in this case is simple. 
The right to be heard includes the right to a reasonable 
probability of being understood. Our legal system contem-
plates that a defendant charged with a crime has a right to 
be heard asserting defenses of law as well as fact. He is 
accorded the right to trial by jury to hear his factual 
assertions, equally he is entitled to have his legal claims 
resolved by a judge. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama 
continues at page 68: 
What then, does a hearing include? . . . 
The right to be heard would be in many cases, 
of little avail if it did not comprehend the 
right to be heard by counsel. Even the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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intelligent and education layman has small 
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. 
If charged with cringe, he is incapable, 
generally of determining for himself whether 
the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar 
with the rules of evidence. Left without the 
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without 
a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent 
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue 
or otherwise inadmissible. 
Your amicus contends for a simple proposition if a non lawyer 
is generally incapable of defending himself, he is also unlikely 
to be capable of judging the legal claims of others. The 
proposition is so obvious it seems almost silly to urge it. 
Judges must be trained and knowledgeable in the law. Unless a 
judge is trained and knowledgeable in the law, how can he be 
expected to follow the arguments of counsel or evaluate competing 
arguments urged by counsel on each side, on the holding of a 
case, or the meaning of a statute less than clear on its face. 
How can one not trained in the law be expected to recognize 
when a question must be researched by the reading of cases, 
or where the cases may be found, or when found, what they 
stand for? Legal ability is a necessary qualification for a 
judge and legal ability is, learned only by legal education and 
the practice of law. 
Due process of law guaranteed to a defendant in a 
criminal case by the State and Federal Constitutions includes 
a right to ffa fair trial in a fair tribunal." In re Murchison, 
349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). This 
is not a guarantee of a trial free from error or possibility 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of error but it certainly is a guarantee of a trial before 
a judge who is reasonably qualified to recognize and prevent 
or correct error. In Frank v. Mangrum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S. Ct. 
582, 59 L.Ed. 969 (1915), the Court, recognizing that not 
all error violated due process, restated the requirement 
of due process as fimdamental rights including "the right 
to be heard according to the usual course of law in such 
cases." 237 U.S. at 334-5. Your amicus contends that the 
right to be heard includes a reasonable chance of being 
understood. Due process would be violated by trial before 
a judge who did not understand the language which the lawyers 
spoke and in which the statutes and cases were written. But 
as any first year law student knows, law itself is a special 
language, arduously mastered, which must be learned if lawyer 
talk is to be understood and statutes and cases applied as 
they are meant to be applied. As Justice Larsen stated for 
this Court in Christianson v. Harris, 109 U. 1, 163 P.2d 314 
(1945): 
Many attempts have been made to further 
define 'due process1 but they all resolve 
into the thought that a party shall have 
his day in court -- that is each party 
shall have the right to a hearing before 
a competent court, with the privilege of 
being heard and introducing evidence to 
establish his cause or defense. . . 
In 1975, with the state of complexity of the law today, only 
a judge "learned in the law" is capable of serving as a 
"competent court" before whom a defendant may have the 
opportunity of establishing his defense. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and \C'r> b o n n e v o i u m e a f • ha ; ' ; a- -,a ;u*p" '• ^ The 
Crrrp < u d haws '~*r Tho'di ,-f LSoh c o n s i s t a d nT two c \ i ernes 
i r o l e d i r p 1 t h e "laws o f d o n g r e s s s n a i i n n h l e i e t h e t e r r i t o r y 
. h.M-(. . r . ' i N " ^ - . dames o r a t a h R e p o r t s 
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and /-IS bound volumes of nited States Reports (through 
July 197-').. f];v -'tan Cod AIJIU1:":-!'^!! *^- msi -si 
v*'i....f -..''• . mime of the I'cic^^ dn i Keporl .. is . 
published every fL-;/ v;eol;s as are the Federal Supplements, 
the Federal l'e^rri"' ;?; a.r: *"• .\.;; iona.'«. roportt.-rs a~ each 
or the regioa:- in the
 :sa( ;oi. The opinions of the United 
States Supreme Court- ncr ; no 1('7V7< ,«i: ^(ui.njetuu last 
J ..llL s..<m< '."' ' , m • .*'- i' . ay memorandum 
opinions) of volume vdd of tMe fupsci.e :'mrt Jlopoiter. 
Prpcech! ay fdw e.-'S'-s m, y , :i.-t\<j w'j is a i ^  ," - ; , <. ..< , . m:y of 
t .-. * •; i ' s i:i'c.i.Mi'ii,; . r; < h o "I 07^ tori-. 
lu a speech deliverer m i!.- -Mrrr [ can tar Association 
at I L S me.d::in°- ~: ' ' ' •"•::'...•/ ay, . , reporting 
on the state of id:. federal courts noted t \*n het:v;oer; 1953 
sue \c-''"> the number of '!fu'!l signed opinion-d* •;.<*.• d ' ..'•• 
Sup: ".<> ^  *u.'. . <• ' • *• '.•• more t iian u i ^ ; ^ ^ ; iy ', f.yi siyned 
opinions j'n f J £v" : J'd y, !cF/°>). Ourina the same l:vvir ; -'ear 
period the rubber of c'\r-( r d^r^a ,*d . .. a 
ha*- i'•.•]'. from i?f;f> .;. i'•)':>>> -A; yi-' ^  In ~h'7'it ' (dried 
Justice Rurger began his remarks \.'i_!h <: ceo: at ion f-jiii 
Dean Roseoe I\--.,,u* : • |V " '-Re ,-: «.•. icin 
courts in the ddth ecnlcry c^ *n I ci i.-u ;>n carried -a v/I*_h 
methods and procedures of the Jdth and 'Addi centuries. 
'We ;irn i"n ? h *• *-" -- - " an o>a; • u'.> c. cm UP;'1"! materials, 
legal doc''-m on:; .:ad n< a'1 ^  dovd.opiiui ia-<\ As ce-, legal 
Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial branch, 93 Siip, 
Ct. Rep. 3291 (1974). 
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mater J. a Is proliferate the tasks o!: lawyering and judging 
become increasingly ororo r., X^r onn-.- .00 ..". \u-.od 
judge can rely \:oon the Io:iefs and arguments o r c.^ i-isei and 
his own training and experience in resolving new and diffi-
c . • , ".:• b ! •• . J uc winn. does a justice of the peace 
without legal training, do when faced with a conflict between 
counsel or vhou c-.i-ons..?! refers i.e.; a line of case precedents 
sale to establish a proposition of law? 
A class n misdemeanor, triable by i'tab Stal:uLes before 
a law mr'.nu n^ty j LK!,- .>. • , ; •• . ..-.- ••v- i : Linou iustice of : re 
peace may raise i ssues o!: statutory Intorpiretat i on , uhe 
relevar.ee and signi f Lcanco of case preoodon; •- , _ .,-. ! o , 
federalist! ana toe appiicaniiity u:' unit.: a ntnm-^ Say :"eire 
Court decisions on federal Constitutional questions, '-tali • 
]no roogai'g [ s rh.' y sacc i < o o : :. w ; • a !v " : t ed to the 
bar, b.t;.,\. 7!-.:-ol-2!3 „ As reenacted in Wo;a? l;:-.- statute 
e 1 iminate 11 a previo 1 is exceptior. oermi11iru.- ncr-1 awyers to 
serve a* noario- ssLecneys, Yet we SI. I .: :. permit persons* 
not qualified to be lawyers to serve as justices of the 
peace. Perhaps the pra.ct\\ • ^ .• * : • et~-ud d 
bv a view that minor crimes iaecssarify ooolve oely stmoie 
legal i ssues. That view "i s ;,.i Longer si rpportable in fact. 
The Supreme Cjiua. spol e * .. •• o i nt: I n Arger singer v. 
Ham Lin . qH? n. a „ ;• " , ;';•,
 vi';"/;a: 
We are by .no means convinced [not Legal 
and constitutional questions involved 
in a case that actually leads io imprison-
ment even for a brief period are any loss 
complex than when a person can be S O I L 
off for six. months or i-i.ro . 
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Argersinger holds that duo process requires appointment 
of counsel for an indigent defendant, absent knowing and 
intelligent waiver, whenever the defendant faces the 
possibility of a sentence to imprisonment. The Court's 
holding compels a parallel conclusion, that due process . 
requires trial before a law trained judge in similar cases, 
since without a judge competent to rule on the legal issues 
in his case, the defendant's right to counsel will be 
rendered ineffective in any case which involves substantial 
issues of law., 
POINT II 
THE INCOMPETENCE OF THE NON LAW TRAINED JUSTICE 
OF THE PEACE IS AGGRAVATED BY THE STATE'S FAILURE 
TO PROVIDE SUCH JUSTICES WITH ACCURATE RESOURCES 
AND ASSISTANCE IN RENDERING LEGAL DECISIONS. 
At the time of the district court's decision below, 
the means provided by the state to shield the justices from 
legal error resulting from their lack of learning in the law 
was a Manual for Justices of the Peace in the State of Utah 
prepared by Brigitte M. Bodenheimer in 1956. While the 
manual is written in a lucid and simple style, it is today 
hopelessly outdated and affirmatively misleading, as a few 
examples will show. The non law trained judge faced with 
a question of law and no means or ability to resolve it is 
likely to rely heavily on the representations of the County 
Attorney. The manual expressly approves this practice. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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On page 14 the following advice appears: 
There will no clribt be many occasions, ^ •• 
however, when the answer to 1lis problem 
cannot be found in this book. In such 
case it is recommended that the justice 
get in touch with the county attorney of 
his county who is the legal advisor of 
the county's precinct officers. 
Again at: page 59: 
The defendant is often not represented 
by counsel in a justice court. County .' 
attorneys are accustomed to that fact 
and are generally able to play the role 
of both prosecutor and defense attorney 
with fairness to both sides. (Emphasis 
added). 
Given such, advice in his manual it shoe e ho no suv*:u*'se 
if -t justice of the peace resists appointing a second 
defense attorney (h : r iu n\C'' • ' tue prosecutor) or 
an indigent defendant. At prj,e ]> "«,h'i(,,.e on instructing 
Sometimes after the justice has finished 
his instructions to the jury, one or both 
. attorneys may ask him to add further charges 
to the jury, which the attorney reads to him. 
The justice then says: 'I so charge1 or 
11 refuse to so charge.1 If he is in doubt 
on how to rule, the county attorney, if 
present, will generally come to his aid.. 
(Emphasis added) 
The effect of this advice i i t tl le offi cial 'Manual is to 
invite? • h<- "neutral" \uh e to defer, when out r.f his legal 
doner:,
 L- * < ' 'unislnn ef one o r "h- litigant1?: counsel.. 
The right: • <- decision by an Lr.^ a: u ^ u .: ] is denied 
in fact whenever th- untrained iud)\e r; en lien enon to decide 
a question OL law uiluouu the In m-U d;,r , .- irainhig to decide 
1 1: : i n that situation he is officially advised to rely upon 
the prosecutor I Defendant's r/;_jit \ c he heard in his own 
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defense in effect becomes his right to be heard by opposing 
counsel! 
A cautionary statement on the role of the county 
attorney does appear in the manual, in chapter 11 on 
Preliminary Hearings, page 89: 
The Justice will often seek the guidance 
of the county attorney: he must not 
forget however that the county attorney 
is obligated to represent one side in the 
proceedings and to prosecute the defendant 
with all legitimate means at his disposal 
while it is the duty of the magistrate 
to stay above the parties as an impartial 
judge. 
This advice, however, in addition to being inconsistent 
with that quoted above, comes in the chapter related to 
preliminary hearings of felony cases and indictible misde-
meanors. It does not appear in the chapters relating to 
criminal trials. In Salt Lake County, where preliminary 
hearings are held in Salt Lake City Court rather than before 
a justice of the peace, the justice will have little or no 
immediate occasion to read chapter 11. 
In September 1975, a new Manual for Justices of the 
Peace was issued, published by the State Court Administrator. 
This Manual is a considerable improvement over the one in 
use at the time of the judgment below but it does not solve 
the problem. The new Manual itself states in a preface by 
Richard B. Peay, State Court Administrator, dated August 25, 
1975: 
One word of caution should be noted. 
This manual is not intended to take 
the place of a compilation of Utah laws. 
It refers to the Utah Code in almost 
every paragraph and is designed to be 
used in conjunction with the Code. The Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-16-
Code is as Indispensable L«> : he justice 
of the peace as it: is; to any other judj-ie 
in the State. It s realized that more 
than half of the justices do not have 
ready access to a complete and up-to-date 
Utah Code. " ~ fKmuhasis added) 
Thus av have tin": ne\; manual replacing an outmoded and easoLete 
~.a*uai Vsi^aja , > r-- luu-ui in con j unetiur. vith the lh_.ih d(..:o 
>;iut::i is i;ot avalleeLe in Its entire tv < e : ••:'< ' a: .' • :' •> f 
the iJS-ices of the peace la the Stale, iie'r c\rcv\ i: CoCes 
\.'(H'C! -A,.!, , . •• e/, i acv'i1, ,11 s u r a l ! auf v:eu laai aP. ai ned 
lav: JiararLes to supplement t he rev innual Lor justices u: ih.e 
r'eace, Lnac wuulu nut an sufficient for on-'1 could uo ,.;ore 
exnect: a person not tr.tia" • a . he . a,j .' ' a, i 1 * ' a j 
sorely because r,uuy,'li':d T..TiLh I a v. Looks than eaaj eoii. u cxroct 
a ':\;a-r "a a»ua . • u effectively as a surgeon \;iien supplied 
with medi a a 1 I n s i aa i: a • n t s . 
POINT •; i 
A REQUIREMENT THAT JUSTICES OF THE PEACE BE TRAINED 
IN THE LAW IS CONSISTENT WITH OTHER PROVISIONS OF 
UTAH LAW REQUIRING SPECIAL TRAINING OR EXPERIENCE 
IN THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSIONS AFFECTING OTHER 
PEOPLE'S LIVES. 
Tna J ,v s o-*: the S,/-'- r' d-,-• • • -hi!-: ..->,- no, admitted 
to tin.' 'Mr f'roi-, practicing law. • ..•. >',; /',-5i--:,. :-x; .airly, 
Utah laws uri'i'hlc requirements ci education, train In;-: or 
experience for a number of other professions: n!v--:; ; . !.a;c 
U.C.A. S jM-12-2 ; dentists U.C.A. !) 58-/-2; paimoors U.C.A. 
§ 58-1';-' • 'otorinarinns U.C.A. fi 58-28-2; public school 
teachers U.C.A. § 53-2-15, 16, 21; pharmacists U.C.A. § 58-17-2; 
professional engineers U.C.A. § 58-22-12; practicing psychologists 
U.C.A. § 58-25-2; and dental hygienists U.C.A. § 58-8-2, 3. 
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While special exceptions are made in some of these provisions 
in general, they reflect a requirement of professional education 
before one can practice a profession on other people (or in the 
case of veterinarians, animals). This, in turn, reflects a 
sensible judgment, that in our modern world with public 
education generally available to those who seek it, education 
for a profession can legitimately be made a pre-condition to 
the practice of such professions. Recently indeed,this court 
in Gibb v. Dorius, U. , 533 P.2d 299, (1975) held that 
the withdrawing of blood from the human body for the purpose 
of determining the alcoholic or drug content of the blood 
was the practice of medicine and had to be done by or under 
the supervision and direction of a physician. The court so 
ruled interpreting U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10. It would seem anomalous 
that in the enforcement of the laws against drinking and driving 
a sample of blood cannot be removed from the human body except 
by one acting in accordance with standard medical practice 
but in the enforcement of those very same laws, a person can 
lose his liberty for up to six months upon the judgment of a 
judge with no training or learning in the law. 
Of course, there are justices of the peace without legal 
training whose natural intelligence or talents for law may 
compensate for lack of formal legal education or other legal 
training. Such persons no doubt exist just as there are persons 
whose natural gifts as teacher or healer might make them effective 
public school teachers or physicians despite the lack of pro-
fessional education. But the possible existence of such persons 
would hardly justify compelling one to attend school taught by 
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a teacher without formal training or compelling one to submit 
to an operation by an enthusiastic and possibly gifted amateur. 
Yet the person charged with Lhe crime before a nonlawyer justice 
is compelled to submit to the professional ministrations of one 
without professional training. We submit that the court below 
was correct in ruling that one facing loss of liberty in such a 
hearing was denied due process of law. Indeed, the Code of 
Judicial Conduct approved and adopted by the Justices of this 
Court on March 1, 1974, specifically provides in Canon 3: 
A judge should be faithful to the law and 
maintain professional competence in it. 
Can a justice of the peace without legal training be expected 
to be faithful to the law, to maintain a professional competence 
he never initially obtained? Or, are justices of the peace 
exempted from the Code of Judicial Conduct applicable to other 
judges. The ruling of the court below, we urge, is a ruling 
that one faced with the possibility of loss of liberty is 
entitled to trial before a judge subject to Canon 3 of the 
Code of Judicial Conduct and for whom that Canon has meaning 
in that he could reasonably be expected to meet it. 
POINT IV 
'AFFIRMANCE OF THE DECISION BELOW WILL IMPOSE NO 
UNDUE BURDEN ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
IN THIS STATE BY REASON OF RECENT LEGISLATION 
ALREADY IN EFFECT. 
A court adjudicating a claim of constitutional right is 
often faced with the unfortunate prospect that recognition of 
the right asserted can only be achieved at the cost of con-
siderable inconvenience or difficulty to other substantial 
interests. Happily, in the present case the Court can affirm Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the decision below without burdening the administration of 
justice in the State. By reason of a statute enacted by the 
Legislature which took effect on July 2, 1975, the right 
recognized by the Court below is now also accorded by statute. 
The statute, U.C.A. Special 1975 Supplement § 78-5-4 provides: 
(b) (1) Notwithstanding any provision of 
this code relating to jurisdiction or venue 
of justice courts, every defendant shall be 
accorded the right to be tried and sentenced 
by a judge who is a member of the Utah state 
bar in any matter wherein the judge may have
 : 
the option of imposing a jail sentence. If, 
upon being advised of this right at the time 
of arraignment, the defendant waives this 
right, the judge may then proceed to hear 
the matter and, where warranted, may impose 
a jail sentence. Unless such a waiver is 
executed by the defendant, the case shall be 
forthwith transferred to the nearest or most 
convenient court in that county, which is 
presided over by a judge who is a member of 
the Utah state bar. 
The statute would seem to reflect a judgment of the Utah 
Legislature consistent with the position of the court below, 
that a defendant facing trial before a justice of the peace 
who may impose a jail sentence, has a right, unless waived, 
to trial before a law-trained judge. Of course, the decision 
below may have been a factor in the enactment of the legislation. 
But it is significant that the legislation was enacted so promptly 
following the decision below and before appellate review of that 
decision. Appellants urge in their briefs against the decision 
below that there are several counties in the state where there 
are no practicing lawyers. This point hardly seems significant 
in view of the statute which in any event requires trial before 
a law-trained judge unless waived where defendant faces a 
possibility of imprisonment. The statute applies throughout 
the state and has been enforced since July 2, 1975. Apparently, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the Legislature determined there were no insuperable burdens 
to providing trial before a law-trained judge in the situations 
covered by the statute. There is nothing to indicate the 
legislative judgment has proven faulty nor in any event will 
the decision in this case affect procedures in counties without 
lawyers while the statute remains in effect. 
Appellants1 contention concerning the absence of lawyers 
in several counties in the state actually argues against their 
position. It was bad enough facing trial before a judge without 
legal training anywhere in the state, but it must have been even 
worse in counties where neither the defendant nor, indeed, the 
justice of the peace himself had ready access to legal consulta-
tion. The county without lawyers is likely as well to be a 
county without law books other than, of course, the outmoded 
1956 version of the Manual for Justices of the Peace. The 
appellants1 contention seems to be in a county without lawyers 
it is better to proceed in whatever fashion necessary to dispose 
of cases rather than to arrange to bring two or possibly three 
lawyers in to hear such cases. A defense attorney, a county 
attorney, and a law-trained judge• Your amicus contends that 
to a legal system concerned with justice as well as convenience, 
the appropriate judgment is that made by the Legislature in the 
new statute. A defendant facing possibility of imprisonment 
has the right to trial before a law-trained judge unless he 
waives that right. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT V • 
THE DECISION BELOW IS CONSISTENT WITH UTAH STATUTE 
AND AUTHORITATIVE COMMENTARY ON THE LAW. IT IS ALSO 
CONSISTENT WITH RECENT JUDICIAL OPINIONS IN OTHER STATES. 
The Utah Judicial Code, pursuant to the recently enacted 
statute, U.C.A. Special 1975 Supplement § .78-5-4, recognizes 
that: 
Every defendant shall be accorded the right 
to be tried and sentenced by a judge who is 
a member of the Utah state bar in any matter 
wherein the judge may have the option of 
imposing a jail sentence. 
This is the very right, recognized by the court below, that 
amicus is contending for! Ignoring the statutory right, 
appellants argue that there is a presumption of constitutionality 
to the denial of such a right based upon the presumption of 
constitutionality of legislative judgments. It is difficult 
to see how a presumption of constitutionality can be applied 
to what is no longer the law, especially when the law was 
changed to recognize the very right recognized by the court 
below. If the issue raised on this appeal has not been mooted 
by the new statute, the statute still has some bearing -- if 
nothing else --in terms of the legislative judgment of 
whether there is a right to trial before a judge who is a 
member of the bar in cases where a jail term may be imposed. 
The new statute is consistent with a long history of 
criticism of the justices of the peace not trained in the law. 
Forty-nine years ago, Chester H. Smith wrote in his article, 
The Justice of the Peace System in the United States, 15 Cal. 
L.Rev. 118, (1926), cited on page 9 of one of the briefs of 
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appel lants , t h a t : 
While the j u s t i c e of the peace system has 
a long h i s to ry and has been firmly embedded 
in the fundamental law of the s t a t e s , yet i t 
i s an anachronism in our jurisprudence the 
perpetuat ion of which cannot be j u s t i f i e d , 
15 Cal. L. Rev. at xT. 140 (Emphasis added). 
Smith concludes h is a r t i c l e with the following recommendation 
at p . 141: 
If our states are to realize the ideal of 
Magna Charta . . . there must be state 
wide abolition of tHe office of justice 
of the peace. This can be accomplished 
. . . . most affectively by constitutional 
enactment. (Emphasis added). 
Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey wrote in a book published for the National Conference 
of Judicial Councils in 1949, Minimum Standards of Judicial 
Administration, at p. 306 that: 
The recommendation that the present justice 
of the peace system should either be eliminated 
or greatly improved epitomizes all recommenda-
tions of every study made of that system. 
Your amicus does not urge the abolition of the justice of the 
peace system, but its improvement, by affirmance of the decision 
below, limiting the power of justices of the peace in criminal 
cases, a limitation now recognized in Utah by statute. This 
limitation is consistent with the standards declared by the 
American Bar Association. In the American Bar Association 
Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating 
to the Function of the Trial Judge, (1972), it is provided 
in Standard 1.2: 
The t r i a l judge should be familiar with 
and adhere to the canons and codes appl icable 
to the j ud i c i a ry , the code of profess ional 
r e spons ib i l i t y applicable to the legal pro-
fession, and standards concerning the proper 
aminis t ra t ion of criminal j u s t i c e . Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The American Bar Association1s Project on Standards for Court 
Organization (1974) recommends in Section 1.21(a) that all 
persons selected as judges: 
. . . should have a broad general and 
legal education and should have been 
admitted to the bar. 
The decision of the Supreme Court of California in Gordon v. 
Justice Court for the Yuba Judicial District, supra, has been 
discussed above in Point I. That the California decision is 
not an isolated phenomenon is shown by a very recent decision 
of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, Perry v. Banks, 521 S.W.2d 
549 (1975). The case involved an appeal from a ruling of the 
Chancery Court, enjoining two nonlawyer candidates for county 
judge from being issued a certificate of election, in the event 
either should be the apparent election winner,on the ground 
that,as nonlawyers,they were not eligible to hold the office 
of county judge. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
ruled that the case was rendered moot because neither of the 
nonlawyer candidates was elected; instead a third candidate, 
a qualified lawyer was elected. Two of the five Justices of 
the Tennessee Supreme Court dissented from the ruling that 
the issue was moot. In an opinion by Justice Henry the two 
dissenters presented their view on the merits of the appeal. 
They were prepared,to rule that a county judge did not, under 
Tennessee law have to be a lawyer but could not constitutionally 
preside in cases wherein a citizen could be deprived of his 
liberty. They said at page 555: 
We further hold that for a non-attorney 
judge to preside over any criminal trial, 
. . . or any other proceeding wherein a 
citizen may be deprived of his liberty, Digitized by th  Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States 
and Article 1, Sec, 8 of the Constitution 
of Tennessee. 
The advancing standards of due process 
compel this conclusion. 
The provision of the Constitution of Tennessee cited by Justice 
Henry,Article 1, Section 8 provides in the very words of Magna 
Carta: 
That no man shall be taken or imprisoned. . . 
or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his 
life, liberty or property but by the judgment 
of his peers or the law of the land. 
While the opinion of two of the five Justices of the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee does not, of course, establish the law of 
that state, it may be regarded as a significant indication 
of Tennessee law, particularly where the other justices do 
not speak to the issue because they find it moot. Certainly 
the opinions in Perry v. Banks, supra, call into question the 
authority of Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772 (Tenn. Ct. of App. 
1972) cited in appellants1 briefs. It should be noted that 
Ditty v. Hampton was a decision of the Tennessee Court of 
Appeals, an intermediate court, and its decision cannot be 
considered authoritative in light of the opinions of the 
Supreme Court of Tennessee in Perry v. Banks, supra. 
A final comment on and quotation from Justice Henry's 
opinion in Perry v. Banks, supra, seems appropriate. In 
Justice Henry's view "the advancing standards of due process 
compel the conclusion11 that, unless he is a lawyer, a county 
judge 
. . . may not preside over . . . any . . . 
proceeding wherein a citizen may be deprived 
of his liberty. 521 S.W.2d at p. 555. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Th is is the position urged ir this case by amicus curiae. 
It is also what is now required, unless waived by defendant, 
by the new Utah statute. We urge this Court to recognize 
no lesser standard for the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Amicus curiae respectfully urges the Court to affirm the 
decision of the district court in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LIONEL FRANKEL 
1863 Hubbard Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
Utah Civil Liberties Union 
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